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Abstract
In this paper, we consider the problem of creating a safe-by-design Rectified Lin-
ear Unit (ReLU) Neural Network (NN), which, when composed with an arbitrary
control NN, makes the composition provably safe. In particular, we propose an al-
gorithm to synthesize such NN filters that safely correct control inputs generated
for the continuous-time Kinematic Bicycle Model (KBM). ShieldNN contains two
main novel contributions: first, it is based on a novel Barrier Function (BF) for the
KBM model; and second, it is itself a provably sound algorithm that leverages
this BF to a design a safety filter NN with safety guarantees. Moreover, since
the KBM is known to well approximate the dynamics of four-wheeled vehicles,
we show the efficacy of ShieldNN filters in CARLA simulations of four-wheeled
vehicles. In particular, we examined the effect of ShieldNN filters on Deep Re-
inforcement Learning trained controllers in the presence of individual pedestrian
obstacles. The safety properties of ShieldNN were borne out in our experiments:
the ShieldNN filter reduced the number of obstacle collisions by 99.4%-100%.
Furthermore, we also studied the effect of incorporating ShieldNN during training:
for a constant number of episodes, 28% less reward was observed when ShieldNN
wasnt used during training. This suggests that ShieldNN has the further property
of improving sample efficiency during RL training.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we will consider the safety of data-trained memoryless feedback controllers3 in the
following context: we will assume an autonomous vehicle that is described by the Kinematic Bicycle
Model (KBM) dynamics (a good approximation for four-wheeled vehicles [1]), and a safety property
that the autonomous vehicle should avoid a stationary, fixed-radius disk in the plane. In particular,
we propose ShieldNN, an algorithm to design Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) safety networks for this
scenario: a ShieldNN network composed in series with any memoryless feedback controller1 makes
the composition of the two controllers provably safe by the aforementioned criterion. This structure
itself distinguishes ShieldNN from most other work on safe data-trained controllers: instead of
designing a single safe controller, ShieldNN uses the KBM dynamics to design a controller-agnostic
NN that corrects – in real-time – unsafe control actions generated by any controller. In other words,
ShieldNN designs a “safety-filter” NN that takes as input the instantaneous control action generated
by a controller (along with the state of the system) and outputs a safe control for the KBM dynamics;
this safety-filter NN thus replaces unsafe controls generated by the original controller with safe
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3RL-trained feed-forward neural networks, for example.
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controls, whereas safe controls generated by the original controller are passed through unaltered –
i.e., unsafe controls are “filtered” out. A block diagram of this structure is depicted in Fig. 1.
The benefits of this approach are manifest, especially for data-trained controllers. On
the one hand, existing controllers that have been designed without safety in mind can be
made safe by merely incorporating the safety filter in the control loop. In this sce-
nario, the safety filter can also be seen as a countervailing factor to controllers trained
to mimic experts: the expert learning can be seen as a design for “performance”, and
the safety filter is added to correct unanticipated unsafe control behavior as needed.
LiDAR/Camera State SensorFour-wheeled Robot
Unsafe Controller
ShieldNN Safety Filter
State MeasurementControl Input
Unsafe
Control
Safe
Control
Figure 1: Block diagram of ShieldNN in the con-
trol loop for a four-wheeled autonomous vehicle.
On the other hand, the controller-agnostic nature
of our proposed filter means that ShieldNN itself
may be incorporated into training. In this way,
the safety filter can be seen to function as a kind
of “safety expert” during training, and this can
potentially improve sample efficiency by elimi-
nating training runs that end in unsafe states.
The main theoretical contribution of this paper
is thus the development of the ShieldNN algo-
rithm. The central pillar of ShieldNN is the no-
tion of a barrier function, because a barrier func-
tion allows the safety problem for a feedback controller to be recast as a set membership problem
for the outputs of said controller. In particular, this recasting reduces the safety-filter design prob-
lem into one of designing a prediction-style NN whose outputs are constrained to lie in a specific
set. As a prerequisite for ShieldNN then, we propose a novel class of candidate barrier functions
for the KBM dynamics that is characterized by three real-valued parameters (one of which is the
safety radius). The necessity for a class of candidate barrier functions stems from the difficulty in
analytically designing a barrier function for the KBM dynamics. Thus, ShieldNN is functionally
divided into two parts: a verifier, which soundly verifies a particular choice of barrier function (from
the aforementioned class), and a synthesizer, which designs the actual ShieldNN filter.
Furthermore, we also validated these theoretical results with experimental validation on four-
wheeled vehicle models. In particular, we apply ShieldNN safety-filters both before and after RL
training for an autonomous vehicle simulated in CARLA [2]. Our results show that incorporat-
ing ShieldNN dramatically improved the safety of the vehicle: it reduced the number of obstacle
collisions by 99.4%-100% in our safety experiments. We also studied the effect of incorporating
ShieldNN during training: for a constant number of episodes, 28% less reward was observed when
ShieldNN wasnt used during training. This suggests that ShieldNN has the further property of im-
proving sample efficiency during RL training.
Related Work. Motivated by the lack of safety guarantees in Deep RL, recent works in the literature
of safe RL have focused on designing new RL algorithms that can take safety into account. The work
in this area can be classified into three categories. The works in the first category focus on how to
modify the training algorithm to take into account safety constraints. Representative examples of this
work include reward-shaping [3], Bayesian and robust regression [4, 5, 6], and policy optimization
with constraints [7, 8, 9, 10]. Unfortunately, such approaches do not provide provable guarantees
on the safety of the trained controller. The second category of literature focuses on using ideas from
control theory to augment the RL agent and provide safety guarantees. Examples of this literature
include the use of Lyapunov methods [11, 12, 13], safe model predictive control [14], reachability
analysis [15, 16, 17], barrier certificates [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 18, 25], and online learning of
uncertainties [26]. Unfortunately, such methods suffer from either being computationally expensive,
specific to certain controller structures or training algorithms or require certain assumptions on the
system model. Finally, the third category focus on applying formal verification techniques (e.g.,
model checking) to verify formal safety properties of pretrained RL agents. Representative examples
of this category are the use of SMT-like solvers [27, 28, 29] and hybrid-system verification [30, 31,
32]. These techniques only assess the safety of a given RL agent instead of designing a safe agent.
2
2 Problem Statement
As described above, we consider the kinematic bicycle model (KBM) as the dynamical model for our
autonomous car. However, the usual KBM is defined in terms of the absolute Cartesian position of
the bicycle , which is inconsistent with the sensing modalities typically available to an autonomous
robot. Thus, we instead describe the bicycle kinematics in terms of relative positional variables that
are directly measurable via LiDAR or visual sensors. In particular, the dynamics for the distance to
the obstacle, ‖~r‖, and the angle of the bicycle with respect to the obstacle, ξ, comprise a system of
ordinary differential equations. These quantities describe a state-space model that is given by:r˙ξ˙
v˙
=
 v cos(ξ − β)− 1rv sin(ξ − β)− v`r sin(β)
a
 ; β , tan−1( `r`f+`r tan(δf )) (1)
r¯
rmin(0) = r¯
Unsafe
Safe
ξ = pi/2
ξ = 0
ξ = pi
rmin(pi) = r¯/(1− σ)
Figure 2: Obstacle specification and mini-
mum barrier distance as a function of relative
bicycle orientation, ξ.
where r(t) , ‖~r(t)‖; a is the linear acceleration in-
put; δf is the front-wheel steering angle input4; and
ψ + ξ = tan−1(y/x). For the sake of intuition, we
note a few special cases: when ξ = ±pi/2, the bicy-
cle is oriented tangentially to the obstacle, and when
ξ = pi or 0, the bicycle is pointing directly at or away
from the obstacle, respectively (see Fig. 2). β is an
intermediate quantity, an invertible function of δf .
We make the further assumption that the KBM
has a control constraint on δf such that δf ∈
[−δfmax, δfmax]. To simplify further notation, we
will consider β directly as a control variable; this is
without loss of generality, since there is a bijection
between β and the actual steering control angle, δf . Thus β is also constrained: β ∈ [−βmax, βmax].
Finally, we define the state and control vectors for the KBM as: χ , (ξ, r, v) and ω , (a, β), where
ω ∈ Ωadmis. , R× [−βmax, βmax], the set of admissible controls.
Problem 1. Consider a KBM robot with maximum steering angle δfmax, length parameters lf = lr
and maximum velocity vmax5. Consider also a disk-shaped region of radius r¯ centered at the origin,
U = {x ∈ R2 : ‖x‖ ≤ r¯}. Find a set of safe initial conditions, S0, and a ReLU NN:
NN : (χ, ω) 7→ ωˆ (2)
such that for any globally Lipschitz continuous controller µ : χ 7→ ω ∈ Ωadmis., the state feedback
controller:
NN (χ, µ(χ)) : χ 7→ ωˆ (3)
is guaranteed to prevent the robot from entering the unsafe region U if it was started from a state in
S0. Equivalently, applying feedback controllerNN (·, µ(·)) ensures that r > r¯ for all time when the
initial condition is chosen in S0.
3 Approach
The most important feature of Problem 1 is that NN is a memoryless function that must correct
the output of a feedback controller instantaneously. The existence of such a corrective function
is not a priori guaranteed for the KBM dynamics. However, the well-known theory of Barrier
Functions (BFs) provides a mechanism for ensuring the safety of a dynamical systems: in short,
barrier functions are real-valued functions of the system state whose properties ensure that the value
of the function remains greater than zero along trajectories of the system [33, 34]. Thus, if a barrier
function is designed so that its zero super-level set is contained inside the set of safe states, then
that subset is forward-invariant; i.e. if the system starts from a safe state, then it will stay safe for
all future time. In this way, barrier functions can be used to to convert safety properties into an
instantaneous – albeit state-dependent – set membership problem for control actions.
4That is the steering angle can be set instantaneously, and the dynamics of the steering rack can be ignored.
5In our KBM model, this technically requires a feedback controller on a, but this won’t affect our results.
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Thus, in the spirit of Problem 1, we employ the usual theory of autonomous barrier functions to
control systems under state-feedback control: i.e. a control system x˙ = f(x, u) in closed loop with
a state-feedback controller pi : x 7→ u. In this scenario, a feedback controller in closed loop converts
the control system into an autonomous one – the autonomous vector field f(·, pi(·)). Moreover, the
conditions for a barrier function can be translated into a set membership problem for the outputs of
such a feedback controller. This is explained in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Let x˙ = f(x, u) be a control system that is Lipschitz continuous in both of its argu-
ments on a set D × Ωadmis.; furthermore, let h : Rn → R with Ch , {x ∈ Rn|h(x) ≥ 0} ⊆ D, and
let α be a class K function. If the set
Rh,α(x) , {u ∈ Ωadmis.|∇Txh(x) · f(x, u) + α(h(x)) ≥ 0} (4)
is non-empty for each x ∈ D, and a feedback controller pi : x 7→ u satisfies
pi(x) ∈ Rh,α(x) ∀x ∈ D (5)
then Ch is forward invariant for the closed-loop dynamics f(·, pi(·)).
Proof. This follows directly from an application of zeroing barrier functions [35, Theorem 1].
Corollary 1 is the foundation of ShieldNN: the only difference is that instead of designing a single
controller pi, we will design a safe “combined” controller NN (·, µ(·)). In this usage, when a con-
troller µ generates a control action, µ(x), that lies outside of the set R(x), NN must map it to a
control within the set R(x).
Thus, Corollary 1 admits the following three-step framework for developing ShieldNN filters.
ShieldNN Framework:
(1) Design a Candidate Barrier Function. For a function, h, to be a barrier function for a
specific safety property, its zero super-level set, Ch, must be contained in the set of safe states.
(2) Verify the Existence of Safe Controls. (ShieldNN Verifier) Show that the set Rh,α(x) is
non-empty for each state x ∈ Ch. This establishes that a safe feedback controller may exist.
(3) Design a Safety Filter. (ShieldNN Synthesizer) If possible, designNN0 such thatNN0 : x ∈
Ch 7→ uˆ ∈ R(x); then obtain a safety filter as:
NN (x, u) :=
{
u if u ∈ R(x)
NN0(x) if u 6∈ R(x). (6)
ShieldNN thus hinges on the design of a barrier function, and then the design of two prediction-
type NN functions: NN0, which generates a safe control at each x ∈ Ch; andNN , which overrides
any unsafe control for a state with the associated value ofNN0.
4 Barrier Function(s) for the KBM Dynamics: the Basis of ShieldNN
It difficult to analytically derive a single barrier function as a function of a particular robot and safety
radius for the KBM. Thus, we instead define a class of candidate barrier functions for a specific
robot: this class is further parameterized by a unit-less scaling parameter and the safety radius, and it
has the property that there are guaranteed parameter choices that actually result in a barrier function.
However, since the analytically guaranteed parameter choices are impractically conservative, this
need a ShieldNN verifier algorithm to establish whether a particular (user-supplied) choice of barrier
function parameters does indeed constitute a barrier function.
In particular, we propose the following class of candidate barrier functions to certify control actions
so that the bicycle doesn’t get within r¯ units of the origin (Problem 1):
hr¯,σ(χ) = hr¯,σ(ξ, r, v) =
σ cos(ξ/2) + 1− σ
r¯
− 1
r
(7)
where σ ∈ (0, 1) is an additional parameter whose function we shall describe subsequently. First
note that the equation hr¯,σ(χ) = 0 has a unique solution, rmin(ξ) for each value of ξ:
rmin(ξ) = r¯/(σ cos(ξ/2) + 1− σ), (8)
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so the smallest value of rmin is rmin(0) = r¯. Thus, the function hr¯,σ satisfies the requirements of (1)
in the ShieldNN framework: i.e. Chr¯,σ , the zero super-level set of hr¯,σ, is entirely contained in the
set of safe states as proscribed by Problem 1, independent of the choice of σ. See Fig. 2, which also
depicts another crucial value, rmin(±pi) = r¯/(1− σ).
Remark 1. Note that hr¯,σ is independent of the velocity state, v. This will ultimately force ShieldNN
filters to intervene only by altering the steering input.
A barrier function also requires a class K function, α. For ShieldNN, we choose a linear function
αvmax(x) = K · vmax · x (9)
where vmax is the assumed maximum linear velocity (see Problem 1), and K is a constant selected
according to the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Consider any fixed parameters r¯, `r and σ. Assume that 0 ≤ v ≤ vmax (as specified by
Problem 1). If K is chosen such that:
K ≥ Kr¯,σ , max({1, 1/r¯}) ·
(
σ
2·r¯ + 2
)
(10)
then the Lie derivative∇Tχhr¯,σ(x) ·fKBM(χ, ω)+α(hr¯,σ(χ)) is a monotonically increasing function
in r for all r ≥ r¯ for each fixed choice of v ∈ (0, vmax] and the remaining state and control variables.
In particular, for all χ ∈ Chr¯,σ such that v ∈ (0, vmax] it is the case that:
Rhr¯,σ ((rmin(ξ), ξ, v)) ⊆ Rhr¯,σ (χ). (11)
In addition to concretely defining our class of candidate barrier functions, Theorem 1 is the essential
facilitator of the ShieldNN algorithm. In particular, note that
Lr¯,σ,`r (ξ, β, v) ,
[
∇Tχhr¯,σ(χ) · fKBM(χ, ω) + α(hr¯,σ(χ))
]
χ=(rmin(ξ),ξ,v)
= v
(
σ
2·r¯·rmin(ξ) sin(
ξ
2 ) sin(ξ−β) + σ2·r¯·`r sin(
ξ
2 ) sin(β) +
1
rmin(ξ)2
cos(ξ−β)
)
(12)
since hr¯,σ((rmin(ξ), ξ, v)) = 0 and αvmax(0) = 0. Hence, the setRhr¯,σ((rmin(ξ), ξ, v)) is independent
of v, so (11) gives a sufficient condition for safe controls (2) in terms of a single state variable, ξ,
and a single control variable β. This simplifies not only the ShieldNN verifier but also the ShieldNN
synthesizer, as we shall demonstrate in the next section.
5 ShieldNN
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(a) Safe/unsafe steering controls.
∪ξR4,0.48((rmin(ξ), ξ, ·)) is shown
in light green; l and u in dark green.
������
Illustrated ShieldNN functions 0 and 
(b) Illustration of NN0 (orange) and
two constant-ξ slices of the final
ShieldNN filter,NN (black).
Figure 3: Illustrated ShieldNN
products for `f = `r = 2 m, r¯ =
4 m, βmax = 0.4636, σ = 0.48.
ShieldNN Verifier: The overall ShieldNN algorithm has three
inputs: the specs for a KBM robot (`f = `r, δf,max and
vmax); the desired safety radius (r¯); and the barrier parame-
ter σ. From these inputs, the ShieldNN verifier first soundly
verifies that these parameters lead to an actual barrier func-
tion for Problem 1. As per Theorem 1, it suffices to show that
Rhr¯,σ((rmin(ξ), ξ, ·)) is non-empty for each ξ ∈ [−pi, pi].
If the sets Rhr¯,σ((rmin(ξ), ξ, ·)) have a complicated structure
(both themselves and relative to each other), then establishing
this could in principle be quite difficult. However, the barrier
functions under consideration actually appear to generate quite
nice regions of safe controls. In particular, it appears to the
case that the set of safe steering angles in any particular ori-
entation state is an interval clipped at the maximum/minimum
steering inputs. That is each such set can be written as:
Rhr¯,σ((rmin(ξ), ξ, ·)) =
[
max{−βmax, l(ξ)}, min{βmax, u(ξ)}
]
,
where l and u are continuous functions of ξ. Even more
helpfully, the function l generally appears to be concave,
and the symmetry of the problem dictates that u(ξ) =
5
−l(−ξ). See Fig. 3a for an example with parameters `f =
`r = 2 m, r¯ = 4 m, βmax = 0.4636 and σ = 0.48;
∪ξ∈[−pi,pi]Rhr¯,σ((rmin(ξ), ξ, ·)) is shown in light green, and l and u are shown in dark green.
Of course these observations about l and u are difficult to show analytically, given the nature of
the equations (c.f. (12)). Nevertheless, we can exhibit a sound algorithm to verify these claims for
particular parameter values, and hence that the input parameters correspond to a legitimate barrier
function. Due to space constraints, the details of this algorithm appear in the supplementary material.
ShieldNN Synthesizer: Given a verified barrier function, recall from (3) in Section 3 that synthesiz-
ing a ShieldNN filter requires two components: NN0 and NN . That is NN0 chooses a safe control
for each state, andNN overrides any unsafe controls with the output ofNN0.
Design ofNN0. This task is much easier than it otherwise would be, since the ShieldNN verifier
also verifies the safe controls as lying between the continuous functions max{−βmax, l} and
min{βmax, u} where l and is concave and u(ξ) = −l(−ξ). In particular, then, it is enough to
designNN0 as any neural network such that
max{−βmax, l} ≤ NN0 ≤ min{βmax, u}. (13)
This property can be achieved in several ways, including training against samples of
max{−βmax, l} for example. However, we chose to synthesizeNN0 directly in terms of tangent
line segments to l (and thus exploit the concavity of l). A portion of just such a function NN0
is illustrated by the orange line in Fig. 3b.
Design of NN . Since the value of NN0 is designed to lie inside the interval of safe controls, the
function NN0 can itself be used to decide when an unsafe control is supplied. In particular,
using this property and the symmetry u(ξ) = −l(−ξ), we can simply choose
NN : β 7→ min{max{NN0(β), β},−NN0(−β)}. (14)
Note: in this construction, the closer NN0 approximates its lower bound, max{−βmax, l}, the
less intrusive the safety filter will be. Two constant-ξ slices of such aNN are shown in Fig. 3b.
6 ShieldNN Evaluation
We conduct a series of experiments to evaluate ShieldNN’s performance when applied to unsafe
RL controllers. The CARLA Simulator [2] is used as our RL environment, and we consider an RL
agent whose goal is to drive a simulated vehicle while avoiding the obstacles in the environment.
The video recordings and other details of the experiments can be found here. The goals of the
experiments are to assess the following:
1. The effect of ShieldNN when applied during RL training (Experiment 1) in terms of the
average collected reward, obstacle avoidance, etc.
2. The safety of the RL agent when ShieldNN is applied after training (Experiment 2).
3. The robustness of ShieldNN when applied in a different environment than that used in
training (Experiment 3).
RL Task: The RL task is to drive a simulated four-wheeled vehicle from point A to point B on
a curved road that is populated with obstacles. The obstacles are static CARLA pedestrian actors
randomly spawned at different locations between the two points. We define unsafe states as those
in which the vehicle hits an obstacle. As ShieldNN is designed for obstacle avoidance, we do not
consider the states when the vehicle hits the sides of the roads to be unsafe with respect to ShieldNN.
Technical details and graphical representations are included in the Supplementary Materials.
Reward function and termination criteria: If the vehicle reaches point B, the episode terminates,
and the RL agent gets a reward value of a 100. The episode terminates, and the agent gets penalized
by a value of a 100 in the following cases: when the vehicle (i) hits an obstacle; (ii) hits one of
the sides of the road; (iii) has a speed lower than 1 KPH after 5 seconds from the beginning of
the episode; or (iv) has a speed that exceed the maximum speed (45 KPH). The reward function
is a weighted sum of four terms, and the weights were tuned during training. The four terms are
designed in order to incentivize the agent to keep the vehicle’s speed between a minimum speed (35
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KPH) and a target speed (40 KPH), maintain the desired trajectory, align the vehicle’s heading with
the direction of travel, and keep the vehicle away from obstacles. The reward function is defined
formally in the Supplementary Materials.
Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) [36] was used to train a neural network to perform the desired
RL task. The network receives measurements ξ and r, which are synthesized from CARLA position
and orientation measurements to simulate LiDAR input. The network then outputs the new control
actions: throttle, ζ, and steering angle, δf . The steering angle δf is subsequently processed by the
ShieldNN filter to produce a corrected “safe” steering angle δˆf , which is applied to the simulated
car with the original throttle input generated by the PPO agent. The ShieldNN filter is synthesized
according to Section 5 with the parameters r¯ = 4 m, σ = 0.48 and KBM parameters δfmax =
pi/4, lf = lr = 2m, and vmax = 20m/s. The full details of the architecture and signal processing
for the agent are provided in the supplementary materials.
Experiment 1: Effect of ShieldNN During RL Training The goal of this experiment is to study
the effect of applying ShieldNN to an RL agent during training. We train three RL agents for 6000
episodes each in order to compare (i) the collected reward and (ii) the obstacle hit rate after an equal
number of training episodes. The three agents are characterized as follows: Agent 1 is trained with
no obstacles and without the ShieldNN filter in place (Obstacles OFF + Filter OFF); Agent 2 is
trained with obstacles spawned at random but without ShieldNN in place (Obstacles ON + Filter
OFF); and Agent 3 is trained with obstacles spawned at random and with the ShieldNN filter in
place (Obstacles ON + Filter ON).
When obstacles are not present (Agent 1), the RL agent quickly learns how to drive the vehicle, as
indicated by the rapid growth in the reward function shown in Fig. 4a. When obstacles are present
but ShieldNN is not used (Agent 2), the RL agent’s ability to learn the task degrades, as indicated by
a 30% reduction in collected reward. However, when obstacles are present and the ShieldNN filter
is in place (Agent 3), the agent collects 28% more reward on average than Agent 2, and collects a
similar amount of reward to Agent 1. This is an indication that ShieldNN filters improves the training
of the system by reducing the number of episodes that are terminated early due to collisions.
Similar behavior can be observed in Fig. 4b, which shows the obstacle collision rate (averaged
across episodes). This figure shows that Agent 2 is slowly learning how to avoid obstacles, since its
average obstacle collision rate decreases from 80% to 47% in 60000 episodes. However, Agent 3,
which uses ShieldNN during training, has an obstacle collision rate of almost zero. In total, Agent 3
suffers only three collisions across all 60000 episodes. We believe that these three collisions are due
to the discrepancy between the KBM and the dynamics of the vehicle used by the CARLA simulator.
(a) Reward (raw & smoothed data for 3 cases) (b) Obstacle collision rate
Figure 4: Results of Experiment 1, evaluation of effect of ShieldNN during training.
Experiment 2: Safety Evaluation of ShieldNN The goal of this experiment is to validate the safety
guarantees provided by ShieldNN when applied to non-safe controllers. To do this, we evaluate the
three trained agents from Experiment 1 in the same environment they were trained in, and with
obstacles spawned randomly according to the same distribution used during training. With this
setup, we consider two evaluation scenarios: (i) when the ShieldNN filter is in place (ShieldNN ON)
and (ii) when ShieldNN filter is not in place (ShieldNN OFF). Table 1 shows all six configurations
of this experiment. For each configuration, we run 200 episodes and record three metrics: (i) the
minimum distance between the center of the vehicle and the obstacles, (ii) the average percentage
of track completion, and (iii) the percentage of hitting obstacles across the 200 episodes.
Fig. 5a and 5b show the histograms of the minimum distance to obstacles for each configuration.
The figure also show two vertical lines at 2.3 m and 4 m: the former is the minimum distance at
which a collision can occur, given the length of the vehicle, and the latter is the value of the safe
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distance r¯ used to design the ShieldNN filter. Whenever the ShieldNN was not used in the 200
testing episodes (ShieldNN OFF, Fig. 5a), the average of all the histograms is close to the 2.3 m line
indicating numerous obstacle collisions. The exact percentage of obstacle hit rate is reported in Table
Table 1. Upon comparing the histograms in Fig. 5a with those in 5b, we conclude that ShieldNN
nevertheless renders all the three agents safe: note that the center of mass of the histograms shifts
above the safety radius parameter, r¯, used to design the ShieldNN filter. In particular, Agents 2 and 3
were able to avoid all the obstacles spawned in all 200 episodes, while Agent 1 hit only 0.5% of the
obstacles spawned. Again, we believe this is due to the difference between the KBM used to design
the filter and the actual dynamics of the vehicle. In general, the obstacle hitting rate is reduced by
99.4%, 100% and 100% for Agents 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
Training Testing Experiment 2 Experiment 3A
Config Obstacle Filter Filter TC%1 OHR%2 TC%1 OHR%2
1 OFF OFF OFF 7.59 99.5 27.53 79.5
2 OFF OFF ON 98.82 0.5 98.73 0.5
3 ON OFF OFF 94.82 8.5 71.88 34
4 ON OFF ON 100 0 100 0
5 ON ON OFF 62.43 44 50.03 60
6 ON ON ON 100 0 100 0
1 TC% := Track Completion % 2 OHR% := Obstacle Hit Rate %
Table 1: Experiment 2 & 3, evaluation of safety and performance with and without ShieldNN.
Experiment 3: Robustness of ShieldNN in Different Environments The goal of this experiment
is to test the robustness of ShieldNN when applied inside a different environment than the one used
to train the RL agents. We split the experiment into two parts:
Part 3-A: We use the same setup and metrics as in Experiment 2, but we perturb the locations of the
spawned obstacles by a Gaussian distribution N (0, 1.5)m in the lateral and longitudinal directions.
Fig. 5c and 5d show that despite this obstacle perturbation, ShieldNN is still able to maintain a safe
distance between the vehicle and the obstacles whereas this is not the case when ShieldNN is OFF.
Table 1 shows an overall increase of obstacle hit rate and a decrease in track completion rate when
ShieldNN is OFF compared to the previous experiment. This is expected, as the PPO algorithm
is trained with the obstacles spawned at locations with a different distribution than the one used
in testing. However, ShieldNN continues to demonstrate its performance and safety guarantees by
having almost 100% track completion rate and almost 0% obstacle hit rate.
Part 3-B: We use a completely different environment and track than the ones used in training, but we
spawn the obstacles at locations with the same distribution used in training. We first perform transfer
learning and train the pretrained Agents 2 and 3 for 500 episodes in the new environment. In this
case, ShieldNN still achieves the desired safety distance on average, and achieving exactly zero
obstacle hitting rates in both cases; it also achieves track completions of 98% and 97% respectively.
Implementation details and results for Experiment 3B are included in the Supplementary Material.
(a) Experiment 2, ShieldNN OFF (b) Experiment 2, ShieldNN ON
(c) Experiment 3A, ShieldNN OFF (d) Experiment 3A, ShieldNN ON
Figure 5: Distributions of distance-to-obstacles for experiments 2 & 3, with and without ShieldNN.
Side Effects of ShieldNN: In our experiments, applying ShieldNN during training had the side
effect of creating a higher curb hitting rate during both training and testing, as compared to the case
when the agent was trained with ShieldNN OFF. In particular, after training for 6000 episodes, the
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curb hitting rate for agent 2 went from 100% down to 8%. However for agent 3 it went from 100%
down to 30%. This is due to the fact that ShieldNN forces the vehicle to steer away from facing
an obstacle which, in turn, increases the probability of hitting one of the sides of the road. This
side effect suggests the possibility for future research in generalizing ShieldNN to provide safety
guarantees against hitting environment boundaries as well.
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Proofs for Section 4
Additional Notation
Throughout the rest of this appendix we will use the following notation:
Lr¯,σ,`r (χ, β) , ∇Tχhr¯,σ(χ) · fKBM(χ, (β, a))
= v
(
σ
2 · r¯ · r sin(ξ/2) sin(ξ − β) +
σ
2 · r¯ · `r sin(ξ/2) sin(β) +
cos(ξ − β)
r2
)
. (15)
Where fKBM is the right-hand side of the ODE in (1) and the variable a is merely a placeholder,
since the (40) doesn’t depend on it at all. In particular, (40) has the following relationship with (12):
Lr¯,σ,`r (ξ, β, v) = Lr¯,σ,`r ((rmin(ξ), ξ, v), β). (16)
Moreover, we define the following set:
C˜hr¯,σ ,
{
χ′ = (r′, ξ′, v′)
∣∣ h(χ′) ≥ 0 ∧ 0 < v′ ≤ vmax}, (17)
which is the subset of the zero-level set of hr¯,σ that is compatible with our assumption that 0 < v ≤
vmax (see Problem 1).
Proofs for Section 4
There are two claims from Section 4 that require proof.
1. First, we stated Theorem 1 without proof.
2. Second, we claimed that for any KBM parameters `r = `f and δfmax , there exists a safety
radius, r¯, and a barrier parameter, σ, such that hr¯,σ and αvmax (as defined in (7) and (9))
comprise a barrier function for the KBM.
We provide proofs for each of these in the next two subsections.
Proof of Theorem 1
We prove the first claim of Theorem 1 as the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. Consider any fixed parameters r¯, `r, σ and vmax > 0. Furthermore, define
Kr¯,σ , max({1, 1/r¯}) ·
(
σ
2·r¯ + 2
)
. (18)
Now suppose that hr¯,σ is as in (7), and αvmax is as in (9) with K is chosen such that K ≥ Kr¯,σ.
Then for each (ξ, v, β) ∈ [−pi, pi]× (0, vmax]× [−βmax, βmax], the function
Lξ,v,β : r ∈ [r¯,∞) 7→ Lr¯,σ,`r ((r, ξ, v), β) + αvmax(hr¯,σ((r, ξ, v))) (19)
is increasing on its domain, dom(Lξ,v,β) = [r¯,+∞).
Remark 2. Note the relationship between the function Lξ,v,β in (19) and the function used to to
define Rh,α in Corollary 1. That is the set that we are interested in characterizing in Theorem 1.
Proof. We will show that when K ≥ Kr¯,σ, each such function Lξ,v,β has a strictly positive deriva-
tive on its domain. In particular, differentiating Lξ,v,β gives:
∂
∂r
Lξ,v,β(r) =
∂
∂r
[Lr¯,σ,`r ((r, ξ, v), β) + αvmax(hr¯,σ((r, ξ, v)))]
= v
(
− σ2·r¯·r2 sin(ξ/2) sin(ξ − β)− 2 cos(ξ−β)r3
)
+ K·vmaxr2
≥ v (− σ2·r¯·r2 − 2r3 )+ K·vmaxr2 . (20)
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To ensure that this derivative is strictly positive, it suffices to choose K such that
v
(
− σ
2 · r¯ · r2 −
2
r3
)
+
K · vmax
r2
≥ 0. (21)
For this, we consider two cases: r¯ < 1 and r¯ ≥ 1.
When r¯ ≥ 1, then 1/r3 ≤ 1/r2 for all r ≥ r¯. Thus it suffices to choose K such that
K ≥ v
vmax
( σ
2 · r¯ + 2
)
, (22)
which is assured under the assumption that v ∈ (, vmax] if
K ≥ σ
2 · r¯ + 2. (23)
Now, when r¯ < 1, choosing K according to (23) ensures that (21) is true for all r ≥ 1. Thus, we
also have to ensure (21) holds for r¯ ≤ r < 1. But in this case, 1/r3 ≥ 1/r2, so (21) will be satisfied
if
K ≥ 1
r¯
( σ
2 · r¯ + 2
)
. (24)
Thus, the desired conclusion holds if we choose K ≥ Kr¯,σ as defined in the statement of the
lemma.
Now, we have the prerequisites to prove Theorem 1.
Proof. (Theorem 1) The first claim of Theorem 1 is proved as Lemma 1. Thus, it remains to show
that for any χ = (r, ξ, v) ∈ Chr¯,σ with v ∈ (0, vmax] — that is χ ∈ C˜hr¯,σ — we have that (11) holds.
However, this follows from Lemma 1.
In particular, choose an arbitrary χ′ = (r′, ξ′, v′) ∈ C˜hr¯,σ , and choose an arbitrary ω′ = (β′, a′) ∈
Rhr¯,σ ((rmin(ξ
′), ξ′, v′)); as usual we will only need to concern ourselves with the steering control,
β′. First, observe that by definition:
(β′, a′) ∈ Rhr¯,σ ((rmin(ξ′), ξ′, v′))
=⇒ Lr¯,σ,`r ((rmin(ξ′), ξ′, v′), β′) + αvmax(hr¯,σ((rmin(ξ′), ξ′, v′))) ≥ 0. (25)
However, the conclusion of this implication can be rewritten using the definition (19):
(β′, a′) ∈ Rhr¯,σ ((rmin(ξ′), ξ′, v′)) =⇒ Lξ′,v′,β′(rmin(ξ′)) ≥ 0. (26)
We now invoke Lemma 1: since rmin(ξ′) ≥ r¯ by construction, Lemma 1 indicates that Lξ′,v′,β′ is
strictly increasing on the interval [rmin(ξ′), r′]. Combining this conclusion with (26), we see that
Lξ′,v′,β′(r
′) ≥ 0. Again using the definition of Lξ′,v′,β′ in (26), we conclude that
Lr¯,σ,`r ((r
′, ξ′, v′), β′) + αvmax(hr¯,σ(r
′, ξ′, v′))) ≥ 0. (27)
Thus, we conclude that (β′, a′) ∈ Rhr¯,σ (χ′) by the definition thereof (see the statement of Theo-
rem 1). Finally, since χ′ and ω′ were chosen arbitrarily, we get the desired conclusion.
Proof of That a Barrier Function Exists for Each KBM Instance
For hr¯,σ and αvmax to be a useful class of barrier functions, it should be that case that at least one of
these candidates is in fact a barrier function for each instance of the KBM. We make this claim in
the form of the following Theorem.
Theorem 2. Consider any KBM robot with length parameters `r = `f ; maximum steering angle
δfmax ; and maximum velocity vmax > 0. Furthermore, suppose that the following two conditions
hold:
(i) βmax ≤ pi/2, or equivalently, δfmax ≤ pi2 ;
(ii) 1`r (σ(1− σ)`r + σr¯) sin(pi4 +
βmax
2 ) sin(βmax) ≥ 2; and
12
Then for every χ = (r, ξ, v) such that 0 < v ≤ vmax the set Rhr¯,σ (χ) is non-empty. In particular,
the feedback controller (interpreted as a function of ξ only):
pi : ξ 7→

−βmax ξ < −
ξ ξ ∈ [−βmax, βmax]
βmax ξ > 
(28)
is safe.
Remark 3. Note that there is always a choice of r¯ and σ ∈ (0, 1) such that condition (ii) can be
satisfied. In particular, it suffices for r¯ and σ to be chosen such that:
2
(`r/r¯)
sin(βmax) sin(pi/4 + βmax/2)
≤ σ. (29)
Thus, by making r¯ large enough relative `r, it is possible to choose a σ ∈ (0, 1) such that the
inequality (29) holds, and (ii) is satisfied.
Proof. (Theorem 2) As a consequence of Theorem 1, it is enough to show that
Rhr¯,σ ((rmin(ξ), ξ, vmax)) is non-empty for every ξ ∈ [−pi, pi].
The strategy of the proof will be to consider the control β = pi(ξ), and verify that for each χ =
(r, ξ, v) ∈ C˜hr¯,σ such that ξ ∈ [0, pi], we have:
Lr¯,σ,`r (ξ, pi(ξ)) ≥ 0. (30)
The symmetry of the problem will allow us to make a similar conclusion for ξ ∈ [−pi, 0].
We proceed by partitioning the interval [0, pi] into the following three intervals:
I1 , [0, βmax], I2 , (βmax, pi/2 + βmax], I3 , (pi/2 + βmax, pi].
and consider the cases that ξ is in each such interval separately.
Case 1 ξ ∈ I1: In this case, pi(ξ) = ξ, and ξ ≤ βmax ≤ pi/2 by assumption. It is direct to show that:
cos(ξ − pi(ξ)) = cos(0) ≥ 0 (31)
and
sin(ξ/2) sin(ξ − pi(ξ)) = 0. (32)
Hence, the cos term in (12) can be lower bounded by zero, and the first term in (12) is identically
zero by (32). Thus, in this case, (12) is lower bounded as as:
Lr¯,σ,`r (ξ, βmax) ≥
σ · v · sin(ξ/2) sin(pi(ξ))
2 · r¯ · `r , (33)
which of course will be greater than zero since ξ ∈ I1 = [0, βmax] with βmax ≤ pi/2 by assumption
(i).
Case 2 ξ ∈ I2: In this case, pi(ξ) = βmax. Thus, for ξ ∈ I2, we have that:
cos(ξ − βmax) ≥ 0 (34)
sin(ξ/2) sin(ξ − βmax) ≥ 0 (35)
sin(ξ/2) sin(βmax) ≥ 0. (36)
Consequently, (30) is automatically satisfied, since all of the quantities in the Lie derivative are
positive.
Case 3 ξ ∈ I3: In this case, pi(ξ) = βmax as in Case 2. However, the cos term is now negative in this
case:
0 > cos(ξ − βmax) ≥ − 1
r¯2
. (37)
Thus, since the other two terms are positive on this interval, we need to have:
sin( 12 (
pi
2 + βmax))
(
σ(1−σ)
2·r¯2 sin(pi − β) + σ2·r¯·`r sin(β)
)
≥ 1r¯2 . (38)
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This follows because on I3, sin( ξ2 ) ≥ sin( 12 (pi2 + βmax)) and sin(ξ− βmax) ≥ sin(pi− βmax); i.e. we
substituted the lower and upper end points of I3, respectively. Noting that sin(pi−βmax) = sin(βmax),
we finally obtain:
sin( 12 (
pi
2 + βmax)) sin(βmax)
(
σ(1−σ)
2 +
σr¯
2·`r
)
≥ 1. (39)
The preceding is just another form of (ii) so we have the desired conclusion in (30).
The conclusion of the theorem then follows from the combined consideration of Cases 1-3 and
Theorem 1 as claimed above.
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Proofs for Section 5
Additional Notation
Throughout the rest of this appendix we will use the following notation:
Lr¯,σ,`r (χ, β) , ∇Tχhr¯,σ(χ) · fKBM(χ, (β, a))
= v
(
σ
2 · r¯ · r sin(ξ/2) sin(ξ − β) +
σ
2 · r¯ · `r sin(ξ/2) sin(β) +
cos(ξ − β)
r2
)
. (40)
Where fKBM is the right-hand side of the ODE in (1) and the variable a is merely a placeholder,
since the (40) doesn’t depend on it at all. In particular, (40) has the following relationship with (12):
Lr¯,σ,`r (ξ, β, v) = Lr¯,σ,`r ((rmin(ξ), ξ, v), β). (41)
Moreover, we define the following set:
C˜hr¯,σ ,
{
χ′ = (r′, ξ′, v′)
∣∣ h(χ′) ≥ 0 ∧ 0 < v′ ≤ vmax}, (42)
which is the subset of the zero-level set of hr¯,σ that is compatible with our assumption that 0 < v ≤
vmax (see Problem 1).
Proofs
ShieldNN Verifier
Recall that the main function of the ShieldNN verifier to soundly verify that
Rhr¯,σ((rmin(ξ), ξ, ·)) =
[
max{−βmax, l(ξ)}, min{βmax, u(ξ)}
]
, (43)
for a concave function l and with u(ξ) = −l(−ξ). The conclusion about u follows directly from the
symmetry of the problem, so we will focus on verifying the claims for l.
As a foundation for the rest of this subsection, we make the following observation.
Proposition 1. Suppose that (43) holds with u(ξ) = −l(−ξ). Then for any ξ′ ∈ [−pi, pi] such that
l(ξ′) ∈ (−βmax, βmax) it is the case that
Lr¯,σ,`r (ξ′, l(ξ′), ·) = 0. (44)
Proof. This follows directly from the definition of Rhr¯,σ , and the fact that we are considering it on
the barrier, i.e. for χ′ = (rmin(ξ′), ξ′, v) which implies that h(χ′) = 0 and hence that αvmax(h(χ
′)) =
0.
This suggests that we should start from (44) in order to establish the claim in (43). To this end, let
a < b be real numbers, and define:
bd[a,b] , {(ξ′, β′) ∈ [a, b]× [−βmax, βmax] | Lr¯,σ,`r (ξ′, β′, ·) = 0} (45)
with the appropriate modifications for other interval types (a, b), (a, b] and [a, b). We also define a
related quantity:
dom(bd[a,b]) = {ξ ∈ [a, b] | ∃β.(ξ, β) ∈ bd[a,b]}. (46)
We can thus develop a sound algorithm to verify (43) and the concavity of l by soundly verifying
the following three properties in sequence:
Property 1. Show that bd[−pi,pi]∩
(
[−pi, pi]×{−βmax}
)
= {(ξ0, βmax)}; that is bd[−pi,pi] intersects
the lower control constraint a single orientation angle, ξ0. And likewise bd[−pi,pi] ∩
(
[−pi, pi]×
βmax
)
= {(−ξ0, βmax)} by symmetry.
Property 2. Verify that bd[ξ0,pi] is the graph of a function (likewise for bd[−pi,−ξ0] by symmetry),
and that bd(−ξ0,ξ0) = ∅. Thus, define l according to graph(l) , bd[ξ0,pi].
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Property 3. Verify that l as defined in Property 2 is concave.
The ShieldNN verifier algorithm expresses each of these properties as the sound verification that
a particular function is greater than zero on a subset of its domain. Naturally, the functions that
are associated with these properties are either L itself or else derived from it (i.e. literally obtained
by differentiating), and so each is an analytic function where the variables ξ and β appear only
in trigonometric functions. Thus, these surrogate verification problems are easily approachable by
over-approximation and the Mean-Value Theorem.
With this program in mind, the remainder of this appendix consists of one section each explaining
how to express Property 1-3 as minimum-verification problems. These are followed by a section
that describes the main algorithmic component of the ShieldNN verifier, CertifyMin.
Verifying Property 1
To verify Property 1, we can start by using a numerical root finding algorithm to find a zero of
L(ξ,−βmax, ·), viewed as a function of ξ. However, there is no guarantee that this root, call it ξˆ0
is the only root on the set [−pi, pi] × {−βmax}. Thus, the property to be verified in this case in the
assumptions of the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Suppose that L(ξˆ0,−βmax, ·) = 0. Furthermore, suppose that there exists an  > 0
such that:
(i) ∀ξ ∈ [−pi, ξˆ0 − ] . L(ξˆ0 − ,−βmax, ·) > 0;
(ii) L(ξˆ0 − ,−βmax, ·) > 0 and L(pi,−βmax, ·) < 0;
(iii) ∀ξ ∈ [ξˆ0 − , pi] . ∂2∂ξ2L(ξ,−βmax, ·) > 0.
Then ξˆ0 is the only root of L(ξ,−βmax, ·) on [−pi, pi]× {−βmax}. That is Property 1 is verified.
Proof. If (i) is true, then there are obviously no zeros of L on [−pi, ξˆ0 − ].
If (iii) is true, then L(ξ,−βmax, ·) is a convex function of ξ on the interval [ξˆ0, pi]. But if (ii) is
also true, then ξˆ0 must be the only zero of L on the same interval. This follows by contradiction
from the assertion of convexity. If there were another zero on (ξˆ0, pi], then the line connecting
(ξˆ0,L(ξˆ0,−βmax, ·)) and (pi,L(pi,−βmax, ·)) would lie below this point by assumption (ii), hence
contradicting convexity. A similar argument can be made if there were a zero on [ξˆ0 − , ξˆ0).
Crucially, the conditions (i)-(iii) of Proposition 2 are conditions that can be checked either by veri-
fying that a function is greater than 0 on an interval (as for (ii) and (iii)), or else that L as a particular
sign for particular inputs (as in (i)). Thus, ShieldNN verifier can establish Property 1 by means of
the CertifyMin function that we propose later.
Verifying Property 2
Our verification of Property 2 depends on the conclusion of Property 1. In particular, let ξ0 =
ξˆ0 be the single root of L on
(
[−pi, pi] × {−βmax}
)
as verified above. As before, we provide a
proposition that gives us sufficient conditions to assert the conclusion of Property 2, and where
verifying those conditions requires at worst checking the sign of some L-derived function on an
interval (or rectangle).
The main technique for proving that bd[ξ0,pi] is the graph of a function is to note that constant-level
curves of L are solutions to the ODE defined by its gradient. In particular, then, bd[ξ0,pi] contains
such a solutions in the rectangle of interest, since it is a subset of the zero-constant level curve of
L. Thus, we can verify the desired properties of bd[ξ0,pi] by considering the aforementioned ODE,
and demonstrating that it has only one solution in the rectangle of interest. This is the subject of the
following proposition and the structure of its subsequent proof.
Proposition 3. Let ξ0 be as above. Now suppose the following two conditions are satisfied:
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(i) ∂∂ξL(ξ0,−βmax, ·) > 0;
(ii) for all (ξ, β) ∈ ([ξ0, pi]× [−βmax, βmax]) it is the case that
∂
∂β
L(ξ, β, ·) < 0; (47)
and
(iii) there exists  > 0 and βˆ0 ∈ [−βmax, βmax] such that
(I) ∀ξ ∈ [−βmax, βˆ0 − ] . L(pi, βˆ0 − , ·) < 0;
(II) ∀β ∈ [βˆ0 − , βmax] . ∂∂βL(pi, β, ·) > 0.
Then bd[ξ0,pi] is the graph of a function, and we can define the function l on [ξ0, pi] by graph(l) ,
bd[ξ0,pi].
Proof. Consider the ODE defined by:
ξ˙ = − ∂∂βL(ξ, β, ·)
β˙ = ∂∂ξL(ξ, β, ·). (48)
The solutions to (48) are guaranteed to exist and be unique on [ξ0, pi] × [−βmax, βmax], since the
vector field is locally Lipschitz on that rectangle (it is differentiable). Thus, any solution of (48) is
guaranteed to follow a constant-level curve of L within this rectangle; the particular constant-level
curve is decided by the value of L for its initial condition.
As a first step, we establish two facts about the solution of (48) with initial condition (ξ0,−βmax):
1. the β component of this solution is strictly increasing; and
2. the solution exits [ξ0, pi]× [−βmax, βmax] only through its ξ = pi edge.
First note that some initial portion of this solution must be contained in [ξ0, pi] × [−βmax, βmax]
assumption (i) and assumption (ii) applied to (ξ0,−βmax). Statement 1 is thus established directly by
assumption (ii). Now we establish 2. Note that the solution cannot exit via the ξ = ξ0 edge because
its β component is strictly increasing. And it can’t exit the β = ∓βmax edges either, because we
have verified that L has only one root on each edge, (ξ,−βmax) and (−ξ0, βmax), respectively. This
leaves only the ξ = pi edge. The solution must leave this rectangle eventually, by the exclusion of
the other edges and the fact that its β component is strictly increasing. Thus, it exits via the ξ = pi
edge.
The final conclusion about the functionality follows if bd[ξ0,pi] if bd[ξ0,pi] corresponds exactly to
the single, unique solution described above. To verify this, we need to verify that there is a single
root of L along the ξ = pi edge, much as we did to verify Property 1; this is made possible by
assumption(iii), items (I)-(II).
As in the case of Proposition 2, the conditions of Proposition 3 are conditions that can be checked
using the CertifyMin function that we will propose subsequently.
Verifying Property 3
We verify Property 3 starting from the assumption that verifications of Property 1 and Property
2 were successful. In particular, we assume a function l with domain [ξ0, pi] that defines the lower
boundary of the set Rhr¯,σ , and which is characterized entirely by L(ξ, l(ξ), ·) = 0.
Since l corresponds exactly to such a constant-level contour, we can use derivatives of L to compute
the derivative of l with respect to ξ. That is if we define
γ′(ξ, β) , − ∂Lr¯,σ,`r/∂ξ
∂Lr¯,σ,`r/∂β
(ξ, β) (49)
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then l′(ξ) = γ′(ξ, l(ξ)).
By extension then, it is possible to derive the second derivative of l using L if we define:
γ′′(ξ, β) , ∂∂ξγ
′(ξ, β) + ∂∂β γ
′(ξ, β) · γ′(ξ, β) (50)
so that l′′(ξ) = γ′′(ξ, l(ξ)). This gives us an obvious sufficient condition for the concavity of l.
Proposition 4. Suppose that ξ0 and graph(l) , bd[ξ0,pi] as above. If for all (ξ, β) ∈ [ξ0, pi] ×
[−βmax, βmax] we have that
γ′′(ξ, β) < 0 (51)
then l is concave.
Proof. Direct from the calculations above.
CertifyMin and the ShieldNN Verifier
We have listed a number of conditions, which when verified together, are sufficient to prove that
a particular set of parameters leads hr¯,σ to be a barrier function for the KBM. Furthermore, each
of these conditions involves asserting that L or its derivatives are strictly positive or negative on an
interval or a rectangle.
Since L is composed of relatively simple functions, it is possible for a computer algebra system
(CAS) to not only obtain each of these verification functions automatically, but to further differ-
entiate each of them once more. Thus, we can combine an extra derivative with the Mean-Value
Theorem to verify each of these individual claims. We describe this procedure as CertifyMin
below.
Algorithm 1: CertifyMin.
input : function f(ξ, β) that is either L or one of its derivatives; ξ-interval [ξ`, ξh]; β-interval [β`, βh]; a sign
s = ±1. Either ξ` = ξh or β` = βh may be true but not both.
output: N est
1 function CertifyMin(f , ξ`,ξh, β`, βh, s)
2 Df← SymbolicGradient(f)
3 if ξ` = ξh then
4 DfNorm← SymbolicNorm(SymbolicGetComponent(Df, β))
5 else if β` = βh then
6 DfNorm← SymbolicNorm(SymbolicGetComponent(Df, ξ))
7 else
8 DfNorm← SymbolicNorm(Df)
9 end
10 gridSize← 1
11 refine← True
12 while refine do
13 gridSize← gridSize/10
14 refine← False
15 for (ξ′, β′) in GridIterator(gridSize,ξ`,ξh, β`, βh) do
16 if s · f(ξ′, β′) < 0 then
17 return False
18 else if s · f(ξ′, β′) < √2· gridSize · DfNorm(ξ′, β′) then
19 refine← True
20 break
21 end
22 end
23 end
24 return True
25 end
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Experimental Details from Section 6
Experimental Details
Integrating ShieldNN with PPO
We train a Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) [36] neural network in order to perform the desired
RL task. To speed up policy learning as in [37], we encode the front camera feed into a latent vector
using the encoder part of a trained β-Variational Auto-Encoder (β-VAE). As shown in Fig. 6b, the
encoder takes 160x80 RGB images generated by the simulated vehicle’s front facing camera and
outputs a latent vector that encodes the state of the surroundings. The inputs to the PPO Network
are: The latent vector [z1, ..., zdim], the vehicle’s inertial measurements (current steering angle δcf ,
speed v and acceleration a) and the relative angle ξ and distance r between the vehicle and the
nearest obstacle. The latter two measurements are estimated using an obstacle detection module that
takes the vehicle’s LIDAR data as input. In our experiments, we assume we have a perfect obstacle
detection estimator and we implement it by collecting the ground truth position and orientation
measurements of the vehicle and the obstacles from CARLA then calculating ξ and r. The PPO
network outputs the new control actions: Throttle ζ and steering angle δf . We omit using the brakes
as part of the control input vector, as it is not necessary for this task. However, the RL agent will
still be able to slow down the vehicle by setting the throttle value to 0 due to the simulated wheel
friction force in CARLA. The throttle control action ζ gets passed directly to CARLA, while the
steering angle control action gets filtered by ShieldNN. The filter also takes ξ and r as input and
generates a new safe steering angle δˆf . To train the VAE, we first collect 10,000 images by driving
the vehicle manually in CARLA along the desired route with obstacles spawned at random locations
and observing different scenes from different orientations. We train the VAE encoder with cross
validation and early-stopping. Then, after convergence, we visually inspect the reconstructed image
to test the accuracy of the VAE encoder.
Reward Function
The reward function used for training all three agents is as follows:
R(s) = Ws ∗RSpeed +Wc ∗RCentering +Wa ∗RAngle +Wd ∗RDistToObst
, where
RSpeed =

v
vmin
, v < vmin
1− vtargetvmax , v > vtarget
1 otherwise
RCentering = max
(
1− dc
lmax
, 0
)
RAngle = max
(
1−
∣∣∣∣acpi
9
∣∣∣∣ , 0)
RDistToObst = max
(
min(
r
rmax
, 1), 0
)
v is the current vehicle’s speed, dc is the current lateral distance between the center of the vehicle and
the track, ac is the current angle between the heading of the vehicle and the tangent of the track’s
curvature, r is the distance between the center of the vehicle and the nearest obstacle, r = 0 if
obstacle doesn’t exist, lmax = 10m, rmax = 20m, vmin = 35KPH, vmax = 45KPH, vtarget =
40KPH .
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(a) RL Task: Goal is to drive the vehicle
from point A to point B without hitting ran-
dom obstacles (the blue circles) spawned
along the route
(b) Integration Framework of ShieldNN with PPO in-
side a CARLA simulator Environment.
Figure 6: Environment Setup and Integration Framework
Experimental Results
Part 3-B: Robustness of ShieldNN in New Track
This experiment is essentially an evaluation of the ability (or not) of RL agents equipped with
ShieldNN to generalize to novel environments. To evaluate performance in this setting, a trans-
fer learning task is implemented where the pretrained Agents 2 and 3 are then retrained for 500
episodes in the new environment (compare to 6000 training episodes for the original experiments).
The new environment is a city road surrounded by buildings, as opposed to the urban highway en-
vironment used in the original training. This modification substantially shifts the distribution of the
camera feed input.
Fig. 7 shows the results for Configurations 4 and 6; recall from Table 1 in the main text that these
configurations represent when (re)training is conducted with ShieldNN OFF and ON, respectively.
Note that configuration 2 – where the original training was done in an environment with no obstacles
– could not successfully complete the track during re-training for 500 episodes nor in testing, and
is thus not included in the figure. Observe that in both configurations, the agent is still able to
avoid obstacles for the 200 number of test episodes. Furthermore, configuration 6 (both retraining
and testing with ShieldNN ON), the agent appears to behave more conservatively with respect to
obstacle avoidance.
Figure 7: Results of Experiment 3-B, distributions of performance metrics within a completely novel
environment relative to training.
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